Fabio Di Cristina
Ex-Ante Controls In Procurement Procedures: A Wild-Goose Chase For Public Authorities? An Eu Perspective
Enhancing integrity in public procurement is a common aim of both nation States and supranational bodies and has thrust sharply into focus the size of prevention. On the one hand, different and wide notions of integrity and corruption exist, as well as partisan scientific approaches. On the other, the range of ex ante public controls over integrity violations, based on the belief that expelling corruptors is much more important than preventing corruption itself, seems too broad to be effective. What can we learn from the new European directives on public procurement? Is it possible to sketch a common substratum for integrity in public procurement entailing more defined public instruments to prevent illegality and drive out potential misconduct? Is it possible to move from a traditional public control-based model towards an incentive model using sector-specific rules to increase the costs of corruption?